There are three levels of troop capability in the new army: one, two, and three. Level three refers to troops that have just completed basic training, level two refers to troops that are able to work with soldiers, and level one refers to troops that can work by themselves.
Members of NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I) opened a Joint Staff College in ar Rustamiyah in Baghdad on September 27, 2005 with 300 trainers. Training at bases in Norway, Italy, Jordan, Germany, and Egypt has also taken place and 16 NATO countries have allocated forces to the training effort.<ref>Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard - Post-War Iraq:Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction - Congressional Research Service</ref>
The Multi-National Force Iraq has also conducted a variety of training programs for both enlisted men and officers including training as medics, engineers, quartermasters, and military police. Beyond the various courses and programs being held in-country, both American staff colleges and military academies have begun taking Iraqi applicants, with Iraqi cadets being enrolled at both the United States Military Academy and the US Air Force Academy.<ref>DJ Elliott and CJ Radin - Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle - Long War Journal</ref>
Recruits and enlisted men
Iraqi Army recruits undergo a standard eight-week <ref name="CRS 2007-04-27">Iraq - Post-Saddam Governance and Security, CRS Report for Congress, p.41</ref> basic training course that includes basic soldiering skills, weapons marksmanship and individual tactics. Former soldiers are eligible for an abbreviated three-week "Direct Recruit Replacement Training" course designed to replace regular basic training to be followed by more training once they have been assigned to a unit.
Soldiers later go on to enroll in more specific advanced courses targeted for their respective fields. This could involve going to the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms Branch School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School.
The Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute located in Taji plays a significant role in training aspiring Iraqi non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. The training is based on a Sandhurst model, chosen in part due to its shorter graduation time compared to West Point. Much of the Iraqi officer training programme is copied directly from the Sandhurst course.
CMATT's main recruiting stations are located in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The most desired recruits are individuals who have prior military service or are skilled in specific professions such as first aid, heavy equipment operation, food service and truck driving. A recruitment target of approximately one thousand men is desired to eventually form a 757-man battalion. Soldier fallout usually occurs due to voluntary withdrawal or failure to meet training standards.
Due to the current demand for these battalions to become active as soon as possible, the first four battalions' officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men are being trained simultaneously (in separate groups). Notable differences in training between CAATT and former training under Saddam's regime include schooling in human rights, the laws of land warfare, and tolerance in a multi-ethnic team.
Based on the philosophy used by the U.S. military to boost its own size in response to World War II — that an army can be built faster by focusing on the training on its leadership rather than enlisted men — CMATT has pursued a similar strategy of focusing recruitment and training on commissioned and non-commissioned officers for the remaining 23 Iraqi battalions. Upon successful completion of officer training, these groups of officers will form the battalion's leadership cadre, which will then be responsible for overseeing its own recruitment, training, and readiness of its enlisted men. It is hoped that having the Iraqi leadership train its own will overcome problems faced by CAATT's training process; namely recruitment, desertion, and unit loyalty.
Military Transition Teams
All Iraqi Army battalions have embedded U.S. Military transition teams, according to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The MiTTs advise their Iraqi battalions in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. Larger scale operations are often done jointly with American battalions. This operational training aims to make the battalion self-sustainable tactically, operationally and logistically so that the battalion will be prepared to take over responsibility for battle space.
The DOD (as of March '07) reported that 6000 advisors arranged in 480+ teams were embedded with Iraqi units.<ref name="DOD 03/07">U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2007), p. 23, p. 25</ref> However, in April, the Congressional Research Service reported that only around 4000 U.S. forces were embedded with Iraqi units at a rate of 10 per battalion.<ref name="CRS 2007-04-27" /> Former U.S. Army analyst Andrew Krepinevich argued that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) is less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort .<ref>Andrew F. Krepinevich, Send in the Advisers - Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments</ref> Krepinevich argues that officers try to avoid taking on advisory tasks due to the US Army's practice of prioritising the promotion of officers that have served with a U.S. unit over ones that have served with foreign forces.<ref name=FirstVN>PRWeb.com, First Vietnamese-American to Serve as a Military Advisor to the New Iraqi Army, 2006</ref>
Iraqi Army sections
Intro History Formations of the Army 1922\u20132003 Reform of the army Structure Current status Rank insignia Training Equipment Notable members See also Notes References Further reading External links
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