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Aftermath::14 July Revolution

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Aftermath

Immediate effects

Abd al-Karim Qasim's sudden coup took the U.S. government aback. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles told President Dwight D. Eisenhower that he believed it was the hand of Nasser that implemented this coup. Additionally, Dulles feared that a chain reaction would occur throughout the Middle East, where the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran would be doomed.<ref name = "Mufti 2003 173">{{#invoke:Footnotes|harvard_citation_no_bracket}}.</ref> The Hashemite monarchy represented a reliable ally that the Western world could rely on thwarting Soviet advances. As such, the coup in Iraq, which was in part inspired by Nasser, compromised Washington's position in the Middle East.<ref name = "Mufti 2003 173"/> Indeed, the Americans saw developments in Iraq in epidemiological terms.<ref>As in Kuwait for example: "The situation in Kuwait is very shaky as a result of the coup in Iraq, and there is a strong possibility that the revolutionary infection will spread there." See {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=book

}}

The frantic Anglo-American reaction to the developments in Iraq, which Allen Dulles asserted was "primarily a UK responsibility", makes for an interesting read, beginning here.</ref> Qasim was to reap the greatest reward, being named Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Arif was to become Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, as well as deputy Commander in Chief.<ref name = "Mufti 2003 173"/> Thirteen days after the revolution, a temporary constitution was announced, pending a permanent organic law to be promulgated after a free referendum. According to the document, Iraq was a republic and a part of the Arab nation whilst the official state religion was listed as Islam. Powers of legislation were vested in the Council of Ministers, with the approval of the Sovereignty Council, whilst executive function was also vested in the Council of Ministers.<ref name = "Mufti 2003 173"/>

1959 instability

{{#invoke:main|main}} On 9 March 1959, the New York Times reported that the situation in Iraq was initially "confused and unstable, with rival groups competing for control. Cross currents of communism, Arab and Iraqi nationalism, anti-Westernism and the 'positive neutrality' of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic have been affecting the country."<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=news }}</ref>

In the wake of the successful coup, the new Iraqi Republic was to be headed by a Revolutionary Council.<ref>{{#invoke:Footnotes|harvard_citation_no_bracket}}</ref> At its head was a three-man sovereignty council, composed of members of Iraq's three main communal/ethnic groups. Muhammad Mahdi Kubbah represented the Shi'a population; Khalid al-Naqshabandi the Kurds; and Najib al Rubay’i the Sunni population.<ref name="Marr 2003 158">{{#invoke:Footnotes|harvard_citation_no_bracket}}.</ref> This tripartite was to assume the role of the Presidency. A cabinet was created, composed of a broad spectrum of Iraqi political movements: this included two National Democratic Party representatives, one member of al-Istiqlal, one Ba'ath representative and one Marxist.<ref name="Marr 2003 158"/>

By March 1959, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and created alliances with left-leaning countries and communist countries, including the Soviet Union.<ref name = "Hunt 2005 76">{{#invoke:Footnotes|harvard_citation_no_bracket}}.</ref> Because of their agreement with the USSR, Qasim's government allowed the formation of an Iraqi Communist Party.<ref name = "Hunt 2005 76"/>

Human rights violations and mass exodus

The 1958 military coup that overthrew the Hashemite monarchy brought to power members of "rural groups that lacked the cosmopolitan thinking found among Iraqi elites". Iraq's new leaders had an "exclusivist mentality [that] produced tribal conflict and rivalry, which in turn called forth internal oppression [...]"<ref name=sng1/>

According to Shafeeq N. Ghabra, a professor of political science at Kuwait University, and, in 2001, director of the Kuwait Information Office in Washington D.C.:<ref name=sng1>Ghabra, Shafeeq N., "Iraq's Culture of Violence", article in Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2001, accessed 16 October 2013; in a footnote at the end of the first sentence ("... political compromise."), Ghabra cites Sa‘d al-Bazzaz, Ramad al-Hurub: Asrar ma Ba‘d Hurub al-Khalij, 2d ed. (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-Ahliya li'n-Nashr wa't-Tawzi‘, 1995), p. 22.</ref>

After the 1958 revolution, Iraq's ruling establishment created a state devoid of political compromise. Its leaders liquidated those holding opposing views, confiscated property without notice, trumped up charges against its enemies, and fought battles with imaginary domestic foes. This state of affairs reinforced an absolute leader and a militarized Iraqi society totally different from the one that existed during the monarchy.

Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fled the country within four years of the 1958 revolution.<ref name=sng1/>


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Aftermath
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