Simulation theory::Intention


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Simulation theory The simulation hypothesis holds that in order to understand intention in others, individuals must observe an action, and then infer the actor’s intentions by estimating what their own actions and intentions might be in the situation.<ref name="Blakemore" /> Individuals connect their own actions to internal mental states through the experience of sensory information when movements are carried out; this sensory information is stored and connected to one's own intentions. Since internal mental states, such as intention, cannot be understood directly through observing movements, it is hypothesized that these internal states are inferred based on one’s own stored representations of those movements.<ref name="Blakemore" />

This theory is supported by research on mirror neurons, or neural regions, including the premotor cortex, and parietal cortex, that activate both when individuals are engaging in an action, and when they are observing the actions of others. This suggests individuals may be simulating the motor movements via internal representations of their own motor movements.<ref>{{#invoke:Citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=journal }}</ref><ref>{{#invoke:Citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=journal }}</ref> Thus, research indicates that humans are hard-wired to notice biological motion, infer intention, and use previous mental representations to predict future actions of others.

Intention sections
Intro  Definition  The development of an understanding of intention  Gaze and attentional acts  Biological motion and inferring intention  Simulation theory  Intentions and behaviors  See also  References  External links  

Simulation theory
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